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Abstract 
The underlying motivations for envy or related social preferences and their 
impact on agricultural innovations are examined by combining data from money 
burning experimental game and household survey from Ethiopia.  In the first 
stage of the money burning experimental game, income inequality is induced by 
providing different endowments and playing a lottery.  In the second, people are 
allowed to decrease (‘burn’) other players’ money at their own expense. 
Conditional on individual behaviour, experimentally measured envious 
preferences from others have a negative effect on real life agricultural innovation.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper uses an experimental set-up to test the proposition that envy or related social 
preferences can be disruptive to economic development, as innovation may be discouraged 
out of fear of negative reaction from others (sometimes manifesting itself in the form of the 
‘evil eye’ and similar attitudes). The paper also examines possible underlying motivations for 
envious preferences. The experiment is run primarily in the field as opposed to the laboratory 
with a sample of subjects on which information on their real life decisions is available. 
Accumulating research in sociology, anthropology, social psychology and economics 
shows that the welfare of individuals is affected not only by the absolute amount of resources 
at their command but also by their relative position vis-à-vis others they compare themselves 
with. These preferences may be the result of envy or related social preferences (such as 
fairness considerations, reciprocity and inequality aversion) which under some range may 
operate equivalently in terms of a negative weight placed on the consumption of other agents 
(e.g., Sobel, 2004). Mui (1995) gives examples from reforming East European countries and 
China of how envy may have constrained the emergence of entrepreneurs because of the fear 
of retaliation. If worse off people try to catch up by working harder and channel envy to 
productive activities (Breitmoser et al., 2009) envy may have a positive effect. But, if envious 
individuals are willing to devote their resources to decrease the welfare of better off people 
(Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001) and if potential innovators feel this may happen, it 
will entail social waste.2 The effect of envy or related social preferences on innovation may 
be institutionally and culturally specific (e.g., Grolleau et al., 2009). 
This paper is the first study we are aware of which tries to capture the negative effect of 
envy empirically in a field setting. While anthropologists and sociologists for long 
emphasized the importance of envy (Bailey, 1971; Schoeck, 1966), more quantitative 
research on its potential role in developing countries is almost non-existent. This paper 
attempts to contribute towards filling this gap. In particular, we employ a money burning 
experimental design (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003) in Ethiopian rural villages, with 
additional sessions being ran at Addis Ababa University in an urban setting. Money burning 
                                                 
2 A different negative effect of envy is captured by Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003) who showed that relative 
incomes are important and found a rivalry effect so strong that a proportional increase in all incomes reduces 
subjective well-being. 
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experiments have two parts: in the first, a distribution of resources is induced; in the second, 
people can use some of their money to decrease others’ money (‘burn’ money). A variant of 
this experimental setup has stealing allowed in place of money burning (Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2002) and shows evidence of reciprocal behaviour.  
Previous sociological and psychological work in Ethiopia (Hoben, 1973; Korten, 1972; 
Levine, 1965) indicates a dominant culture characterized by individualism and the pursuit of 
private rather than communal interests. Levine (1965) argues that there is no sense of 
community in the dominant Amhara3 culture. Except in times of crisis, there is hardly any 
spontaneous cooperation. High degree of suspiciousness and secrecy is pervasive. In addition 
to weaknesses in horizontal forms of cohesion, the society is characterized by hierarchical 
forms of interaction. Holding a position of power significantly increases one’s status. 
Korten (1972) indicates that pressure towards conformity is an important force of social 
control in Ethiopia. An illustration of the strength of social pressure is the concept of 
yilugnta. “Yilugnta is the quality of being very concerned about what other people think and 
includes a fear of open or implicit public criticism. It requires conforming to what other 
people expect, even when such action is against one’s personal interests or beliefs” (Korten, 
1972). Generalizing his findings Korten (1972) concludes: “The characteristics of the zero-
sum, nonshared-sum, non-contingent, limited payoff life game are rather clearly portrayed in 
the data on the Ethiopian society.” These studies on Ethiopia imply that envy and similar 
social preferences probably are very important. 
This research first identifies the level of envious preferences by using money burning 
experimental games and examines the motivations underlying money burning behaviour. 
Then it goes on looking at the correlation between money burning behaviour and agricultural 
innovations. We find that the underlying motive for envious behaviour – as captured by 
money burning in experimental games – is likely reciprocal/retaliatory considerations. While 
individual money burning behaviour increases the probability of agricultural adoption given 
individual behaviour envious preferences from others have negative effects on agricultural 
innovation.  
                                                 
3 The Amhara are the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia but due to the political and social history of the 
country the Amhara culture is dominant. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 respectively describe the 
experimental design and the data collection. While Section 4 discusses the experimental 
results, Sections 5 and 6 provide general discussion and conclusions respectively.  
 
2. Experimental design 
The main objective of this research is to understand the effect of social preferences like 
envy on investment behaviour in general and agricultural innovations in particular. To induce 
inequality, players are randomly given high and low amounts of money at the start of the 
game. The experimental game includes a first stage where participants play a lottery; this 
mimics investment in innovations as the lottery game is a risky undertaking with a relatively 
large potential return. The second stage is a money burning stage where players are allowed 
to decrease the money of others at their own cost. 
In a session of a game thirty individuals participate and are randomly given high (Birr4 
15) and low (Birr 7) amounts of money; we’ll call the first high and the second low income 
players. The players are then divided into five groups with six players in each group, equally 
divided into high and low income players. Anonymity within each group is strictly 
maintained, i.e., even though the thirty participants in a session can see each other, with 
whom they are matched in a group is kept unknown.  In the first stage of the game 
participants can use any amount of their initial endowment to buy a more than actuarially fair 
lottery with a 50% chance of winning thrice the amount invested. 
After the lottery game, players are informed of what amounts of money the other five 
members of their group have saved and how much they have won (or lost) from the lottery. 
All six members of a group will then be asked how much of the money of others in their 
group they would like to ‘burn’ (decrease). Players have to pay from their own money for 
burning the money of others; the price of money burning is one tenth of the amount to burn 
(for example, to decrease another individual’s money by Birr 10, Birr 1 has to be paid). The 
money burning is separately done for saved money and money won from the lottery. This is 
done to capture potential heterogeneity in money burning behaviour from saved and invested 
money. For example, if players tend to burn more from lottery earnings than saved money 
                                                 
4 Birr is the national currency of Ethiopia.  At the time the games were played US$1 was around Birr 8. 
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this can possibly reflect a stronger social preference against earned money – return from a 
risky undertaking – compared to saved money, money given to the players by others (the 
researchers). 
After eliciting the money burning decisions a random dictator design is used to 
determine the actual money to be burnt. Hence, even though the amounts all the six players 
want to burn are recorded only the choice of one will be implemented after a random 
selection.5 
The above described game which includes lottery followed by the random dictator 
money burning stage is repeated three times. At each stage, players are matched with 
different members in a group; the players are informed about this. At the end of the game, 
participants will go home with all the money accumulated over the three stages plus a 
participation fee. 
The above version of the money burning game is implemented in four rural villages 
with 240 people. In addition, the same version is played with sixty university students in 
Addis Ababa, the capital. A slightly different version of the money burning game is played 
with two sessions of university students (sixty students in total). In the version played in both 
rural areas and in Addis Ababa, members of the group change in each stage (random 
matching); hence, an individual player will be grouped with different people at each stage in 
the game. In the version played with only sixty of the university students, members of the 
group stay the same (fixed groups); that is, in all the three stages the same individuals are 
matched in each group (fixed matching). The main purpose of using the second version is to 
increase the number of independent observations to improve statistical power. 
The next section summarises the data collection process. 
 
3. Data collection 
The data for this research are gathered from four villages in Ethiopia which coincide 
with the lowest subdivision of state administration in rural areas known as Peasant 
Associations. The four villages were selected to represent as much of the heterogeneity in 
                                                 
5 Otherwise, if the money burning decisions of all the participants are implemented potentially the money to be 
burnt can be more than the money given to players. 
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farming systems and ethnic composition of the country as can be captured by a relatively 
small sample size. An additional reason for the selection of these villages is the fact that they 
were covered by previous panel household surveys with rich and detailed household level 
information that goes back as far as 1994. 
The four villages are Imdibir, Aze Deboa, Terufe Kechema and Yetmen. Imdibir is a 
village located in the Gurage region, southwest of the capital Addis Ababa, adjacent to the 
local town with the same name. This region is the heartland of a farming system based on 
enset. Enset is the false banana tree and it is used as the staple food among many ethnic 
groups in southern Ethiopia; compared to other crops it’s more draught-resistant giving some 
protection against famine when rains fail. The enset farming system is characterized by the 
use of the hoe in contrast to most cereal producing areas that depend on the ox-plough; 
perennial (permanent) crops instead of annuals like cereals are dominant. The majority of the 
people are members of the Gurage, a highly entrepreneurial ethnic group very active in the 
commercial activities of the country as a whole. 
The second research site is Aze Deboa, a village located in the Kembata region, 
dominated by the Kembata ethnic group, one of the populous ethnic minorities in southern 
Ethiopia. Even though enset is important the dependence of the region on it is not as high as 
in Imdibir, with cereals and other crops playing a more prominent role. The village is located 
in a region where long-distance domestic migration is important; during a significant part of 
the year, male members of the household – mostly household heads – work in far off modern 
plantations. 
The third village is Terufe Kechema, which is located near Shashemene, one of the 
biggest commercial towns in the south of the country. Here enset is not important and 
villages surrounding the town of Shashemene benefit from high demand for vegetables. The 
region, including the research village, is dominated by the Oromo ethnic group, the most 
populous ethnic group in Ethiopia. 
The last village, Yetmen, is the only research site located in the north (northwest of 
Addis Ababa). Like most agricultural systems in the north, farming in the region is 
completely dominated by the cultivation of cereals and the ox plough. Yetmen in particular is 
located in an area well known for the production of teff, a type of cereal used only in 
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Ethiopia. Agricultural production is dominated by teff and wheat and because of the very high 
demand for teff the area is characterized by relative prosperity compared to most rural areas 
of Ethiopia. 
As the above brief description of each village indicates the selection of the survey sites 
maximises the variation in ethnic composition and farming systems. For example, two of the 
most important ethnic groups in Ethiopia – Oromo and Amhara – are the dominant ethnic 
groups in the two sites, Terufe Kechema and Yetmen respectively. Similarly, important 
variations in the settled agricultural systems of the country – the ox-plough and hoe-cultures, 
the enset farming system and systems dependent on annuals like cereals – are all represented. 
Depending on the type of farming systems and the prosperity of the area the spread of 
agricultural innovations is also varied. For example, the uptake of fertilisers in these villages 
is significantly different ranging from a low of 45% in Imdibir to a high of 97% for Yetmen. 
In Terufe Kechema irrigation is used by some farmers, an innovation that is relatively rare in 
Ethiopia. 
While the heterogeneity in farming systems, agricultural technology and ethnic 
composition are good reasons for selecting this survey sites, another important reason is that 
they have already been covered by a comprehensive and long-term panel household survey. 
All the four villages are part of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS), a panel 
household survey that covered more than fifteen rural villages in more than six rounds. The 
households that participated in the experimental games of this research are covered by the 
ERHS. This provides a very rich data set covering the same households for a period of over 
fifteen years including data on agricultural innovations. ERHS provides an unusually rich 
data set that is not available for a small scale research like ours. 
Other forms of data than the experimental games were also collected. Pre-game 
questionnaires were administered before the games collecting background information on 
participants, agricultural practices and innovations and personalities. Post-game 
questionnaires were administered focusing on players’ experience of the game. Lengths of 
ring and index fingers were measured to capture digit ratios - the ratio of the length of the 
index to ring finger. Digit ratios are related to testosterone exposure inside mothers’ womb 
which is expected to influence the character of individuals as the bio-medical literature 
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indicates. While the above-mentioned research instruments were administered on individuals 
participating in the money burning experimental games, additional information was also 
gathered from people that know the villages well through focus group discussions. In all the 
villages, four focus groups – two with male and two with female members of the community 
- were organised. The last source of data is sociological survey. Four sociology lecturers from 
Addis Ababa University were commissioned to write sociological reports for each village 
using both the grey literature and field visits where key informant interviews, local materials, 
folklores, anecdotal evidences and similar information were gathered. 
The rural fieldwork was conducted in February-March 2009. First individuals covered 
by the ERHS were traced; due to low mobility/migration in rural Ethiopia finding households 
that were interviewed in the last round of the rural household survey – in 2004 – was not too 
difficult. In addition, while 60 individuals were required for the two sessions of the money 
burning game, the household survey covered more households in each village making it even 
easier. But some individuals didn’t turn up at the time of the game and hence were replaced 
by others that were not originally covered in the household survey. As a result, 33 out of the 
240 rural participants (14%) were not covered by the ERHS. 
The games were also played with 120 students of Addis Ababa University in February 
2010. The students were mainly at the undergraduate level and from the Education and 
Business and Economics faculties. While two sessions at Addis Ababa University are 
identical to the ones played in rural areas, two sessions with fixed groups of players were also 
conducted, as indicated previously, to increase the number of independent observations and 
hence improve statistical power. 
In most cases in rural areas the games were played in village halls that accommodate 
the players sitting reasonably far apart; in one village the games were played in two big tents. 
In Addis Ababa, the students played the games in a very big hall that can accommodate much 
more people. Research assistants and PhD students were intensively trained and used for 
running the games. In all cases the games were organised and managed by one of the authors 
of this paper; the direct involvement of a senior researcher is crucial for data quality. 
In all cases, participants came to a designated place (hall) to play the games. This helps 
to create a more controlled environment for the game compared to playing it sequentially at 
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different times and places (for example going to homes of participants). But one should also 
emphasis some fundamental differences between the environment in which the games were 
played and that of an experimental game laboratory in a Western university. To start with 
remember that in the rural villages all individuals are drawn from the same village and the 
participants know that – this will likely increase pro-social behaviour in the experimental 
games. In addition, even though membership to groups is anonymous – i.e., players don’t 
know with whom they team-up when making money burning decisions – each participant 
sees the remaining players most or all of whom are likely to be known to him/her; this is 
different from complete anonymity found in proper experimental labs where individuals 
interact through computer terminals. Hence, because of these reasons we expect the money 
burning rates to be biased downwards – in other words, we expect real money burning rates 
to be higher -. 
 
4. Experimental results 
In this section we first provide a general overview of the results. We then go into more 
depth by employing regression analysis to explain money burning and innovation decisions.  
 4.1 General overview 
A total of 360 subjects participated in the experiments, with 30 subjects per session: 
240 in the rural villages (8 sessions with random matching) and 120 in Addis Ababa (2 
sessions with random matching, 2 sessions with fixed groups). About two-thirds of the 
subjects were male in the rural villages (65%), and almost all in Addis Ababa (91%). The 
average age of university students was 21 versus an average of 46 in the villages. Almost all 
subjects from the villages were farmers (94%), with percentages no lower than 88% in any 
individual village; 86% of the subjects from the villages were covered by the Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey. 
Money burning rates are defined as the amount of money that subjects burn out of the 
total available to burn. Table 1 shows the money burning rates observed in our experiments. 
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
Mean money burning rates are about 12% with fixed groups, and about half as much in 
Addis Ababa with randomly matched groups, with the rural villages situated somewhere in 
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the middle. There is more money burning with fixed groups than with random matching, and 
this is confirmed by a Mann Whitney test on the Addis Ababa sample (P = 0.05).6 
Conversely, there is no significant difference in money burning rates between random 
groups in Addis Ababa or in rural villages, or, more interestingly, between whether money is 
burnt out of un-invested earnings or out of lottery earnings – although of course, insofar as 
lottery earnings lead to greater money in pocket, more money will be burnt on average out of 
lottery earnings. 
RESULT 1. Money burning rates are higher with fixed groups than with randomly 
matched groups. 
(Insert Table 2 about here.) 
Table 2 provides average values on a number of other variables. Rural subjects are 
more risk averse than Addis Ababa students, as revealed by their choices to invest less in the 
lottery (Mann Whitney P < 0.001). Lower digit ratios7 have been associated with greater 
competitiveness (e.g., Van den Bergh and Dewitte, 2006; Weis et al., 2007), and on average, 
as expected, are the same across samples. Questionnaire based measures may be subject to 
social desirability biases, insofar as subjects may provide responses that they perceive 
conform to social norms (e.g., Fleming and Zizzo, 2010), and the Marlowe-Crowne 10 items 
measure is an instrument that aims to identify the sensitivity of subjects to such a social 
desirability bias (e.g., Marlowe and Crowne, 1960); while there is evidence of social 
conformism in all samples, there is more from rural villages (Mann Whitney P = 0.001). 
There is evidence suggesting that this bias works strongly against verbal declarations of 
perceptions of envy: there is a striking session level Spearman correlation ρ = -0.690 (P = 
0.001) between our social desirability measure and the stated degree of envy at the end of the 
                                                 
6 Here and below in this section, we consider our tests at the level of independent observations: this means the 
session in the case of random matching sessions, and the group in the case of fixed groups sessions. For 
example, in this Mann Whitney test, n = 10 for the fixed groups and n = 2 for the random matching sessions. 
The regression analysis will employ the data more efficiently while controlling for the potential non 
independence of observations. 
7 Digit ratio refers to the ratio of the length of the index finger to that of the ring finger (also known as 2D:4D) 
and it has been found to be a good index of exposure to prenatal testosterone.  Prenatal testosterone slows the 
growth rate of the left side of the brain while enhancing growth of the right side (Lutchmaya et al. 2004; 
Brosnan 2006).  This difference in early hormonal exposure is found to affect many aspects of human behavior 
like athletic prowess (Hönekopp and Schuster 2010), discounting (Millet and Dewitte 2008), career interests 
(Weis et al. 2007), behavior in ultimatum games (Bergh and Dewitte 2006) and many others including the 
performance of traders in stock exchanges.  Lower digit ratios are associated with higher prenatal exposure of 
testosterone and this is expected to increase such characteristics as aggressiveness and competitive spirits.   
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experiment. The social desirability measure proxies for self-declared social niceness and so it 
is not surprising that it is negatively correlated with self-declared envy. The Big Five is a 
standard personality questionnaire (e.g., Goldberg, 1993; Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Rammstedt 
and John, 2007) and shows no statistically significant differences on any personality 
dimension except for Extraversion,8 rated higher for the Addis Ababa sample but strongly 
negatively correlated to the social desirability measure, for which it may work as a reverse 
proxy (Spearman ρ = -0.704, P < 0.001).9 On average and on a scale from one (very well) to 
four (not at all), the average self-reported measure of understanding of the decision tasks in 
the experimental games was 2.06 in the rural villages and slightly better among university 
students (Mann Whitney P = 0.01, two tailed); Table 2 shows that among the university 
students a slightly better understanding is observed in the fixed groups.10 
 
RESULT 2. Rural village subjects appear more risk averse and socially conformist. The 
fixed group environment was slightly clearer to subjects.  
 
There are some interesting correlations relating to money burning from lottery earnings, 
which emerge already from an analysis that averages out across groups or sessions, as 
discussed above, in order to obtain independent observations.11 In the Addis Ababa data, 
there is a clear negative relationship between lottery earnings and the money burning from 
lottery earnings (Spearman ρ = 0.601, P = 0.039), whereas this is not the case in the rural 
villages.12 Big Five Extraversion has a quantitatively large but statistically insignificant 
negative correlation in the subsamples (rural villages: ρ = - 0.524, P = 0.183; Addis Ababa: ρ 
= - 0.500, P = 0.207). There is some evidence that Big Five Openness predicts greater money 
burning rate from lottery earnings (Spearman ρ = 0.415, P = 0.07), a result that, while not 
reaching statistical significance within the subsample, appears driven by the Addis Ababa 
                                                 
8 The other four dimensions are Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness. 
9 There are no statistically significant correlations between the social desirability measure and the other Big Five 
dimensions. 
10 This is not surprising as the fixed groups environment is arguably a slightly simpler one for subjects to 
understand. 
11 The same relationships do not apply in relation to money burning from not invested earnings. 
12 Spearman ρ = -0.524, P = 0.183; this suggests that money burning from lottery earnings was quite 
independent of the amounts won in rural villages, thus making the burning ratio having (possibly, if not 
statistically significantly so) a negative relationship. 
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sessions (ρ = 0.49, P = 0.11).13 As noted earlier, our social desirability measure is proxying 
for social niceness, and as such we would predict that it is negatively correlated with the 
extent of money burning from lottery earnings. The prediction receives some support in the 
overall sample (ρ = - 0.359, P = 0.06), with point correlations being of larger magnitude once 
we consider subsamples, controlling for the shift in mean money burning rates between the 
Addis Ababa students and the rural villages subjects (ρ = -0.427, P = 0.08 for Addis Ababa; ρ 
= -0.826, P=0.006 for rural villages).  
In the next sub-section factors influencing money burning decisions of players are more 
carefully examined to understand the underlying social preferences. 
 
4.2 Explaining social preferences: why do people burn others’ money? 
In this section we employ regression analysis to examine whether money burning rates 
are correlated to features in the experimental games and to other characteristics of the 
players. The former include investment rates on lottery (as proxy for risk attitudes), dummies 
for receiving a high income in the experiment (High Income), the stage of the experiment 
(Stage 2, Stage 3) and Session 2 (i.e., the second, afternoon session in each village), whether 
the games are played with fixed or changing group (the Fixed dummy) or with university 
students or rural inhabitants (the Addis Ababa University AAU dummy). In addition, we 
include important variables that help us test for some possible underlying motivations for 
money burning like lagged actual money burning rates and proportion of money from high 
income players available for money burning. The other variables include age and socio-
economic characteristics of participants like education dummies (Primary, Secondary, 
Higher/vocational) and religion dummies (Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Other Religions), 
personality traits as captured by the Big Five (Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscentiousness, Neuroticism and Openness) and social desirability scale (SDS) values, 
right and left digit ratios, and emotion values people reported after the games. Additional 
variables in models 4-7 of Table 3 will be described below. 
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
                                                 
13 For rural villages, ρ = 0.096 (P = 0.82). 
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As previously noted, part of the money to be burnt is from money set aside (not 
invested on lottery) and part of it is from lottery earnings. To capture possible heterogeneity, 
the two burning rates are separately used as regressands instead of using an overall money 
burning rate. However, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) is used since the error terms 
from these regressions are not independent as confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan tests. 
In all localities, two sessions of the money burning game were conducted, one in the 
morning and one in the afternoon. All the coefficients on Session 2 are not significant, 
indicating that – as expected – the behaviour of players in the morning and afternoon sessions 
is not different. In the fieldwork, the utmost care was done to avoid communication between 
players in the morning and afternoon, and the regression results confirm that was effective 
avoiding possible contamination due to communication between people in the two sessions. 
In almost all the specifications, money burning rates consistently and significantly 
decrease across stages; this is true both for money burning from non-investment as well as 
lottery earnings (p < 0.01 or 0.05). This is likely due to the low level of money burning rates 
in stage 1; even those that burn money in the first stage decrease their burning after seeing the 
low level of money burning. 
In five out of the seven cases there is weak evidence (mostly at p < 0.1) of ‘high 
income’ players burning proportionally more from non-invested money; but money burning 
from lottery earnings is not significant. The ‘income’ effect on money burning behaviour is 
generally rather weak. 
There is a possible gender effect with respect to money burning rates from non-invested 
money (p < 0.05 except in model 7), while all the coefficients on age and education in all the 
models are not statistically significant.14  
Almost all coefficients on religion – except those for ‘other religions’ – are not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, for the ‘other religions’, while almost all the 
coefficients in the non-invested regressions are not significant, those in relation to lottery 
earnings are significant and negative (at p < 0.05 level). Orthodox Christian, Islam, Protestant 
                                                 
14 The lack of correlation with education probably undermines a view that modern education changes the 
attitude of people towards a more growth oriented paradigm; if this view was right at least in our context, we 
would have found negative coefficients with higher levels of education as money burning is destructive from the 
society’s point of view. 
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and Catholic religions are established formal churches (Orthodox Christianity is the reference 
omitted religion). The ‘other religions’ are mainly minority and traditional ethnic based 
religions that are practiced at local levels. Subjects with these ‘other’ religions burn less 
money from lottery earnings than other religions; but generally they are not different in their 
money burning behaviour with respect to lottery earnings. 
In all the models money burning rates are not significantly correlated to investment 
rates in the games (the proportion of money players used for lottery). This indicates that risk 
taking and money burning behaviours as captured in the experimental games are not 
correlated. 
 
RESULT 3. Money burning is not correlated with education, risk taking and age; men 
burn less of un-invested earnings; less burning out of lottery earnings occurs by subjects with 
minority and traditional ethnic religions. 
 
We next check whether there is a relationship between others’ income and money 
burning in our data, as for example predicted by an inequality aversion based explanation.15 
Note that people make two types of money burning decisions in the games; they are 
separately asked how much to burn from non-invested money and lottery earnings. Also note 
that there are two relevant income distributions – initial and final – that can possibly affect 
players’ decisions. First, at the beginning of the game, half of the players are given higher 
amounts of money than the other half. We calculated the share of high income players from 
the money available for burning. The variables ‘% high income’ and ‘% high income 2’ in 
Table 3 in the part titled ‘Inequality aversion?’ represent the share of initial high income 
players from non-invested money and lottery earnings respectively. But also note that after 
playing lottery the amounts of money players have had changed during the game; hence, the 
income inequality at the end may not tally with initial income distribution. For example, 
initial high income players may have lost after playing a lottery to become low income 
players. To control for this, the sum of money available for burning are included in the 
regression – if final income distribution matters and players are inequality averse they will 
                                                 
15 For a simple review of the inequality aversion model, see Camerer (2003). 
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burn more of the money those that have more money at the end. These two variables are 
named ‘Sum not invested’ and ‘Sum lottery wins’ in the ‘inequality aversion?’ part of Table 
3. Almost all the coefficients are not statistically significant (only one coefficient is 
significant at only p < 0.1 level). Hence, our data does not provide support that underlying 
motivation for money burning is inequality aversion.16 Note that this would not prevent fear 
of envy from being a rationally held expectation: if subjects are richer, there is more that can 
be burnt of them as a result, even though the proportion of their income that gets burnt does 
not increase. 
Another possible underlying motivation for money burning behaviour is retaliation 
and/or reciprocity (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter, 2000) either directly or as a way of making the 
expression of envy legitimate. People may burn other people’s money because they expect 
other people to be burning theirs. To test whether retaliatory/reciprocal motives are important 
in money burning behaviour, we included lagged actual money burnings in our regressions. 
Remember the money burning games have three stages and from the money burning 
decisions of all players in a group only the decision of one is implemented (random dictator 
design). The lagged actual money burnings are those in the previous stage. The lagged money 
burnings from non-invested earnings and lottery earnings are entered as separate variables 
(Lag AMBNI and Lag AMBLW, respectively). There is some evidence that 
retaliatory/reciprocal considerations are possible motivation for money burning behaviour 
especially with respect to lottery earnings (p < 0.1 for Lag AMBNI and 0.05 for Lag 
AMBLW). This may appear surprising since, as demonstrated in further regressions where 
we interacted these variables with whether subjects belonged to fixed group, it can be shown 
that the effect is not restricted to fixed groups. This does not mean that being in a fixed group 
does not increase money burning: the consistent positive coefficients on the fixed groups 
dummy is clear evidence that greater money burning did occur in fixed groups, and conforms 
to Result 1 above. That being said, even when subjects are matched with a different group, 
there are spillover effects from having being treated badly by third parties on what one does 
in terms of money burning: this could operate as a revision of expectations about future 
                                                 
16 We did also experiment by dropping and including the two sets of variables – the percentage of high income 
and sum of money – to see if our results are influenced by multicolinearity; the results do not change. 
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burning or as a form of indirect reciprocity or a rationalization of envious behaviour based on 
indirect reciprocity. It is also interesting to find that there is no significant effect with respect 
to actual money burning from non-invested money. The results suggest that people are more 
sensitive to money burning from money they have ‘earned’ (by playing lottery) than simply 
received. 
 
RESULT 4. Money burning is not only greater as a result of repeated interaction but also, 
when play is one shot and with respect to ‘earned’ lottery earnings, as the outcome of indirect 
reciprocity or a justification of envious behaviour based on indirect reciprocity. 
 
We next consider the variables related to social desirability, the Big Five personality 
scale and digit ratios. In section 4.1 we noted that Big Five Extraversion may work as an 
inverse proxy for social desirability. The regression analysis includes both Big Five and the 
Marlowe and Crowne (1960) social desirability scale in models 4, 5, 6 and 7. As in the earlier 
analysis, Extraversion in most cases is negatively correlated to money burning rates; the 
effect is stronger for money burning rates from un-invested earnings (p < 0.01 or 0.05) 
compared to that from lottery earnings (p < 0.1 or not significant). The social desirability 
measure is statistically significant in models 4, 5 and 6, and higher social desirability 
increases money burning from un-invested earnings (p < 0.05 or 0.01). 
Our regression analysis confirms the bivariate results from the previous section insofar 
as they do not show any effect for Conscientiousness and Neuroticism. Agreeableness and 
Openness have interesting differing effects; while Agreeableness mainly reduces money 
burning from un-invested earnings, Openness’ main effect is to reduce money burning from 
lottery earnings (p < 0.01 or 0.05), which differs from the direction observed in the bivariate 
analysis. Our results seem to suggest that more open people are reluctant to burn the money 
of others which is earned through an effort. 
 
RESULT 5. Subjects that score low in Agreeableness burn more from un-invested 
earnings, whereas subjects that score low in Openness burn more from ‘earned’ lottery 
earnings. 
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To examine if underlying physiological features of individuals affect their money 
burning behaviour, digit ratios are added to models 5, 6 and 7. It will be recalled that lower 
digit ratios are associated with higher prenatal exposure of testosterone and this is expected to 
increase such characters as aggressiveness and competitive spirits. In our case, while right 
hand digit ratios are significantly and (as expected) negatively correlated with money burning 
rates, particularly in relation to money burning from lottery earnings (p < 0.01),17 left hand 
ratios are not. The highly significant and negative correlation between right hand ratios and 
money burning rates of both types strongly suggests that the underlying biophysical traits of 
individuals (such as prenatal hormonal exposure) likely affect their social preferences. The 
fact that only the right hand digit ratios are significant also falls into the findings of the wider 
literature where for some activities only the ratio of one hand has good predictive power (for 
example, see Lutchmaya et al., 2004). 
 
RESULT 6. Lower right hand digit ratios predict greater money burning, particularly in 
relation to lottery earnings. 
 
The final set of variables examines if emotions are systematically correlated to the 
money burning behaviour. At the end of the experimental games, players reported what 
emotions they felt when playing the games. Players who felt ‘fear of envy’ proportionally 
burned more (p < 0.01 and 0.05 in model 6), though the effect is not much robust to 
introducing the Lag AMBNI and Lag AMBLW variables (p < 0.1 in relation to un-invested 
earnings only in model 7). Taken at its face value, this result implies that one of the 
motivations for burning others’ money is the fear that others may burn one’s money. This 
reinforces the previous finding that retaliatory motives seem to play a more important role. 
There is also some rather weak (but interesting) evidence that those people who felt 
‘ashamed’ and ‘irritated’ burn less. Almost all the coefficients on ‘envy’ are not significant. 
 
                                                 
17 P< 0.1 in relation to un-invested earnings. 
18 
 
RESULT 7. There is some evidence that people who reported that they felt ‘fear of envy’ 
while playing the experimental games may proportionally burn more money. 
 
To summarize, while some socio-economic characteristics like religion play a relatively 
weak role in determining money burning, others like age and education are not important 
correlates. There is some evidence that people are justifying burning others’ money based on 
others’ expected burning, though not necessarily those they have been matched with already. 
Personality traits and digit ratios are generally significantly correlated to money burning 
behaviour underlining the importance of controlling for these factors when doing research on 
individual behaviour. The ‘fear of envy’ also seems to be an important motivation for burning 
more money further reinforcing the implication that retaliatory motives are more important. 
The next section will examine the link between innovations and envy as captured by the 
money burning behaviour in the experimental games. 
 
4.3 Innovation and envy 
One of the key objectives of our experiment is to understand the effect of social 
preferences such as envy on innovations in general and agricultural innovations in particular. 
We shall examine these issues by combining our experimental data with household 
information collected by the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS). Note that this 
section uses data only from rural participants because of the focus on agricultural 
innovations. 
Envy, proxied by money burning behaviour in the experimental games, is expected to 
influence agricultural innovations through three different channels. First, individual money 
burning behaviour likely captures relevant individual characteristics correlated to innovation 
behaviour. For example, people willing to burn others’ money are probably more aggressive 
and competitive and hence are expected to be more innovative. Second, the money burning 
behaviour of others (social money burning) is also expected to affect individual innovation 
behaviour; a farmer in a community with high social money burning will be discouraged to 
invest as some of the returns from investment will be destroyed by others. Third, the 
interaction between individual and social money burning is also an important factor. Even 
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though a positive correlation between individual money burning behaviour and innovation is 
expected, if everybody in the community behaves similarly the effect may be different 
depending on feedback effects (externality); high individual and social money burning may 
have a negative effect on innovation. Given other determinants of innovation, the innovation 
function can be presented as follows: 
Iij = f(MBRiji, MBRijs, MBRiji*MBRijs|INij, HHij, Fj)   ... (1) 
In equation (1) the subscripts i and j index households and villages respectively; in our 
sample the households are from four villages hence j runs from 1 to 4. Iij stands for 
innovations implemented by the household, MBRiji and MBRijs stand for individual and social 
money burning rates and INij and HHij represent individual and household characteristics that 
affect innovation and village level fixed effects are captured by Fj. The interaction between 
individual and social money burning is MBRiji*MBRijs. 
To measure the overall adoption rates of households (Iij in equation (1)) a simple 
innovation index is computed using the ERHS data. This index captures twelve agricultural 
innovations introduced at different rounds of the survey; farmers were asked whether they 
grow new crops like coffee and chat,18 whether they have improved livestock, use modern 
agricultural inputs, farm other new crops, use irrigation, water holes, improved seeds and/or 
fertilizer, whether they were selected as model farmers, participated in soil conservation or 
rain harvesting programs. If their responses are affirmative for each of these questions a score 
of 1 is given; if not, a score of 0. The simple sum of these scores provides an index of 
innovation. For example, a farm household that adopted all the twelve innovations will have a 
score of twelve and a household that has not adopted any will have a score of zero. 
(Insert Table 4 about here.) 
A tabulation of the innovation index is given in Table 4. While the mean of the index is 
3.75 the median is four with a maximum of eight and minimum of one; in other words, 
households on the average have adopted around four of the innovations and at least one of the 
innovations have been adopted by all households with the most innovative households 
implementing eight. 
                                                 
18 Chat is a mildly intoxicating plant that is consumed widely both in Ethiopia as well as neighboring countries.  
Chat is an important source of income for the farmers as well as a major foreign exchange earner for the 
country. 
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Community level envious preferences (MBRijs in equation (1)) are proxied by social 
money burning rates that are computed in the following way using the money burning rates 
in the experimental games. For each individual the average money burning rate of all other 
individuals (i.e., excluding the individual’s money burning rate) in the village is computed. 
Social effects should reflect what each individual expects on the average from the rest of the 
people in the village. 
To estimate equation (1) the innovation index is regressed on individual and social 
money burning rates and the interaction between the two in addition to other controls. Note 
that the social money burning rates are computed by averaging the money burning rates of all 
other members of the same village and hence it is strongly correlated to village level fixed 
effects (Fj); hence, the direct effect of social money burning will be absorbed in the village 
fixed effects and there is no statistical variation to disentangle it from the other fixed effects 
since there are only four villages. Hence, the regression estimated has the following modified 
form with the direct effect of social money burning (the coefficient on MBRijs) being 
absorbed in the village fixed effects. 
Iij = f(MBRiji, MBRiji*MBRijs|INij, HHij, Fj)    ... (2) 
The above regression is estimated using OLS, negative binomial and robust regressions 
to examine the robustness of the results to different specifications. The negative binomial 
model is used because the innovation index is count data. Robust regression is to examine the 
robustness of results to significant outliers; the robust regression method uses Cook’s 
distance to eliminate significant outliers and employs an iteration procedure as suggested by 
Li (1985). In addition to using different estimation specifications, the same models are also 
estimated by including different variables to see if results are robust to inclusion and 
exclusion of variables.  
(Insert Table 5 about here.) 
As indicated previously, in the experimental games players were allowed to burn 
money from non-invested earnings and lottery earnings separately. Interestingly, while the 
coefficients on money burning rates from non-invested earnings are consistently not 
significant in all specifications, those from lottery earnings are significant and positive. As 
argued in a previous paragraph, the money burning behaviour of participants especially from 
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that of lottery earnings seems to capture characteristics of individuals (e.g., competitiveness, 
aggression, etc.) that positively impact on agricultural innovations. 
 
RESULT 8. Higher individual money burning rates from lottery earnings are positively 
correlated to agricultural innovations measured by an index based on the Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey. 
 
In addition to the individual money burning rates, the interaction terms between 
individual and social money burning rates are the other variables of main interest. While the 
coefficients on the money burning from non-investment are all insignificant, those on lottery 
earnings are all negative and significant when all covariates are controlled for (p < 0.01 or 
0.05 in models 3). This implies that there is an interesting negative feedback (externality) 
between individual and social money burning. Even though higher money burning behaviour 
from lottery earnings is correlated positively to agricultural innovations, the same behaviour 
negatively affects innovations especially if the social money burning is high in the 
community. For a given individual money burning rate from lottery earnings, the negative 
effect becomes higher the higher the social money burning rate. To illustrate this, we use the 
coefficients from the OLS regression of model 3 in Table 5 and graph the partial effects of 
individual money burning rates and the interaction between individual and social money 
burning rates from lottery earnings (see Figure 1). In the OLS model 3, while the coefficient 
on individual money burning rates from lottery winning is 44.438, the corresponding 
coefficient on the interactive term is -527.769. Hence, the partial effect of the individual and 
interactive money burning rates on the innovation index Iij is equal to 44.438*MBRiji - 
527.769*MBRiji*MBRijs. Each line in Figure 1 represents the effects of different levels of 
social money burning rates (ranging from 0% to 30%) on the innovation index at a given 
level of individual money burning rates (for 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 30%). As can be 
seen from Figure 1, for given individual money burning rates the partial effects decrease 
ultimately falling below zero with higher social money burning rates. The figure also clearly 
shows, that the higher the individual money burning rate the steeper the slope of the curve 
implying the negative effect of social money burning rates on innovation is larger the higher 
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the individual money burning rates. Note that the lines intersect the zero horizontal line 
around 8.4% social money burning rates. This implies that for individuals that face a social 
money burning rate from lottery earnings that is less than 8.4% their individual money 
burning behaviour is associated with higher innovation index; but individuals facing social 
money burning rates higher than 8.4% are associated with lower innovation index. This 
negative impact is higher for those with higher individual money burning behaviour. 
 (Insert Figure 1 about here.) 
 
RESULT 9. The interaction between individual and social money burning from lottery 
earnings is negative and significant implying a negative feedback (externality) that 
individuals with high money burning rates in a community with high money burning tend to 
innovate less. 
 
Even though, as indicated previously, the direct effect of social money burning on 
innovations cannot be separated from the village fixed effects, it’s expected to be negative; 
this is because the social money burning rates capture the willingness of others to destroy 
resources which most likely creates a disincentive to innovate. In fact, when estimating the 
regressions reported in Table 5 without village dummy variables but with social money 
burning rates they are consistently negative and significant. 
Let us now look at the other variables included in the innovation regressions. Almost all 
the individual and household variables reported in the second part of Table 5 are not 
significant. Land cultivated by the household is included to control for income/wealth effects. 
Income and consumption expenditures are not used because of endogeneity concerns, as 
unobservables are likely to be correlated with them. In Ethiopia land is owned by the state 
and allocated on a usufruct basis to farmer households and hence we don’t expect reverse 
causality from innovations to land size as we do in the case of household income/expenditure. 
There is weak evidence that males and married people innovate more compared to females 
and unmarried people. Almost all the coefficients on education except on higher education 
are not significant; the coefficients on higher education, contrary to expectations, are 
negative. But this likely reflects the fact that those with higher education mainly work in non-
23 
 
agricultural activities; since we are considering agricultural innovations the negative 
coefficients are not surprising. There is some rather weak evidence that Catholics and 
Protestants innovate less than Orthodox Christians (the omitted religion); Muslims innovate 
as much as Orthodox Christians. 
The second set of regressions includes Big 5 personality dimensions, the Social 
Desirability Scales (SDS) and digit ratio. Except neuroticism and openness in single cases, all 
other personality and SDS coefficients are not significant. There is some weak evidence that 
right-hand digit ratios are negatively related to innovation. The stronger correlation we 
observed between personality dimensions and digit ratios with money burning behaviour (in 
Table 3) and the lack of correlation with the innovation index imply that these factors likely 
influence innovations not directly but through influencing intermediary characteristics like 
money burning behaviour of individuals. 
The final set of regressions adds emotion and subjective well-being. In a post-game 
questionnaire players were asked which emotion they felt when playing the money burning 
game. These are included in the regressions because they may be reflecting some underlying 
states of the individuals that can affect innovation behaviour. In addition to the emotion 
variables, a variable reflecting the subjective well-being of individuals is also included. In 
one of the rounds of the ERHS respondents were asked to rank their subjective well-being 
using a hypothetical ladder with ten rungs, the highest (tenth) rung representing the best 
possible and the lowest the worst possible life. It’s interesting that there is a significant and 
positive correlation between subjective well-being and innovation. Intriguingly, those players 
that reported they felt joy while playing the experimental game have higher innovation index 
compared to those that reported that they didn’t feel joy at all. Even though the coefficient on 
‘happiness’ is significant and negative in two cases, it is likely driven by outliers as it is no 
more significant when robust regression is used. Overall, individuals with the highest 
subjective well being seem to innovate more. These results are likely capturing some 
underlying individual characteristics relevant for innovation behaviour but not captured by 
the personality questionnaire. 
Finally, the highly significant dummy variables indicate that village level fixed effects, 
including social money burning rates, are very important. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
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indicate that in terms of the innovation index while the village of Aze Deboa is the most 
innovative, Imdibir is the least innovative. 
So far, an index that captures the overall number of innovations by households is used 
as a measure of agricultural innovation. An alternative is to look at individual innovations. In 
a pre-game questionnaire, participants of the experimental games were asked if they use 
fertiliser and improved seeds and harvest rain water. The yes/no responses on these 
innovations are used in probits to examine the role of money burning behaviour (see Table 6 
for results). Advantages of this method are the larger sample, as we need not rely on 
experimental subjects having been part of the EHRS, and the closer connection between 
experimental responses and real world innovation decisions, both temporally and in terms of 
identity of the respondents.19  
(Insert Table 6 about here.) 
As in the case of the innovation index, the individual money burning rates from lottery 
earnings for fertiliser and improved seeds are significant and positive (p < 0.001); in addition, 
the interaction between individual and social money burning rates from lottery earnings are 
negative for these two innovations (p < 0.1 for fertilisers; p < 0.05 for improved seed). These 
results reinforce the results from the regressions on the innovation index. Intriguingly both 
coefficients for rain harvesting are not significant but that for money burning from non–
investment and its interaction with social money burning rates are significant. It’s difficult to 
know why rain harvesting is correlated to money burning behaviour in a different way 
compared to fertiliser and improved seeds use. But it’s apparent that it is a very different type 
of investment compared to the other two. First, rain harvesting requires building relatively 
permanent structures like ponds; the other two don’t. Second, these structures are built on 
land allocated by the state; hence, whether the household has an allocated land that is suitable 
for this investment will definitely affect investment. In contrast, fertiliser and improved seeds 
are more ‘scale neutral’. Third, there is a lot of technical, material and other forms of support 
from the government to encourage rain harvesting. In contrast, the support in terms of 
                                                 
19 While we aimed to take responses from EHRS sampled households, we cannot necessarily guarantee that 
EHRS data was collected from precisely the same individuals who later participated to our experiment. Real 
world innovation information collected in the experiment obviously solves this potential source of noise.   
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subsidies for fertilisers and improved seeds is increasingly diminishing or non-existent. These 
differences in the nature of the innovations may be the underlying causes for the differences. 
 
RESULT 10. While individual money burning rates are significantly and positively 
correlated to the adoption of fertiliser and improved seeds, interactions between individual 
and social money burning rates from lottery earnings are negatively correlated. Rain 
harvesting exhibits a different pattern. 
 
Investment rates on the lottery in the experimental games are highly significant and 
positively correlated to adoption of fertiliser and improved seeds; but the coefficient on rain 
harvesting is significant but negative (p < 0.01). These results also underscore the significant 
difference between rain harvesting and the other two innovations. This difference more or 
less seems to persist with the coefficients on other control variables. Males and older people 
have a higher chance of adopting fertiliser and improved seeds (p < 0.01); but both variables 
are not significant for rain harvesting. Interestingly, the adoption of fertiliser and improved 
seeds is negatively related to land size (p < 0.05); it seems that farmers compensate for the 
small size of their plots by using more fertiliser. Primary and secondary education is 
significant only for fertiliser adoption (p < 0.1 and 0.05 respectively). As in the case with 
innovation index, Catholics have a lesser probability of adopting rain harvesting and 
improved seeds (p < 0.01). There is some weak evidence that some aspects of the Big-5 
personality dimensions like conscientiousness and neuroticism are correlated to some of the 
innovations. The Social Desirability Scale is positively related to the adoption of improved 
seeds (p < 0.001). The negative correlation between right-hand digit ratios and innovation 
survives only for improved seeds (p < 0.01). Even though many emotion variables are 
significant, a clear pattern does not emerge.  
The next section provides general discussion relating the results presented so far with 
the additional information collected through sociological surveys and focus group discussions 
in particular and with the sociological literature on Ethiopia in general. 
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5. Discussion 
“May you have wealth and envious people around you”  
(a proverb from Terufe Kechema, one of the study villages; Esayas, 2009) 
Let us first recapitulate the main results from the quantitative analysis so far. Even 
though some socio-economic characteristics like education and age of players are not 
significantly related to money burning behaviour, there is some evidence that gender and 
religious beliefs (especially minority and traditional religions) are. The evidence also implies 
that more than inequality aversion the main underlying motivation behind money burning 
behaviour is likely reciprocal and/or retaliatory considerations. Some of the Big-5 personality 
dimensions like Extraversion, Agreeableness and Openness are negatively correlated to 
money burning behaviour. The underlying physiological characteristic of individuals related 
to prenatal hormonal exposure as captured by digit ratios is also significantly correlated to 
money burning behaviour. While individual envy as captured by individual money burning 
rates from lottery earnings are positively correlated to agricultural innovations they have a 
negative feedback through their social effect; for given individual money burning behaviour 
higher social money burning decreases innovation.  
As indicated in the data collection section, in addition to the experimental games, we 
compiled sociological reports prepared by university sociology lecturers and conducted eight 
focus group discussions with one male and one female group in each village. Let us 
summarise and discuss the more relevant findings from these qualitative data sources. 
The qualitative data strongly suggest that envy and similar social preferences are 
widespread in the study villages. As the proverb from one of the villages at the beginning of 
this section indicates, envy is considered by most as an automatic consequence of success and 
achievement (‘if you become rich people will envy you’). The sociological reports are full of 
stories that provide anecdotal evidence to the destructive nature of these social preferences 
even among close family members.20 The negative effect on agricultural innovations is 
clearly highlighted by one of the farmers: 
                                                 
20 In Imdibir, one of the study villages, a man is reported to have set fire on his brother’s farm when his brother 
started cultivating a more profitable cereal. 
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“Using better technology might be good in terms of increasing yields. But it also 
increases the number of enemies one might have. You will be targeted by enemies 
including wild animals and those who possess the power of evil eye; they will affect 
your cattle’s fertility as well as the fertility of the soil permanently.” (Desalegn, 2009) 
The reference to the evil eye in the above quotation touches on an important aspect 
that reflects the mentality widespread in Ethiopia in general and in the study villages and has 
an implication on social preferences. The belief in witchcraft and the evil eye is a universal 
pan-Ethiopian characteristic (Levine, 1974) and successful people are routinely suspected of 
witchcraft and witchcraft in turn is also believed to be used against successful people. Even 
though people from some groups are particularly suspected of having the power of witchcraft 
and the evil eye, almost no one is beyond suspicion. A generalised atmosphere of fear and 
suspicion of witchcraft and the evil eye is usually associated with envy (Schoeck, 1966). 
The nature of social differentiation in the study villages is expected to influence social 
preferences. In most rural localities, even though many ethnic groups live together one ethnic 
group is usually dominant; for example, in the four research villages of Aze Deboa, Imbidir, 
Terufe Kechema and Yetmen the Kembata, Gurage, Oromo and Amhara are by far the 
respective dominant ethnic group. This is in contrast to urban areas where different ethnic 
groups are more intermixed. If ethnic variation is taken as an important source of social 
differentiation, this fact gives the impression that the population in these villages are highly 
homogenous. But the sociological reports highlight that even in those villages which are 
dominated by one ethnic group very strong differentiations across sub-clans exist.21 In one of 
the villages 32 sub-clans within the same ethnic group are reported to exist. The social 
distance between sub-clans can be significant as there is a hierarchical relationship between 
them where some of the sub-clans are even considered lowly and sub-human; in many 
instances marriage across sub-clans can be rare (endogamy). These sub-divisions into smaller 
social group have important implication in the distribution of resources and power. The 
current political and administrative structure of Ethiopia is based on ethnicity. Hence, the 
dominant ethnic group control village level political and administrative structures. From the 
qualitative data it’s obvious that there are tensions between the dominant ethnic group and the 
other minorities in almost all the study villages. But at least in the three villages, 
differentiation across sub-clans seems to be more important than across ethnic groups as most 
                                                 
21 Probably the exception is Yetmen which is almost completely dominated by the Amhara ethnic group where 
clans don’t seem to be important. 
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power resides in the hands of one or two sub-clans.22 The implication of this social 
fragmentation on envy and similar preferences is rather complicated but it likely creates a 
fertile breeding ground and these social preferences in turn can negatively affect agricultural 
innovation. For example, in one of the villages members of a minority ethnic group were 
profitably engaged in farming potatoes for the urban market but some of them were forced to 
abandon the enterprise because local people destroyed their crops; even though it is difficult 
to know who exactly did that, it is widely rumoured that members of the dominant group are 
likely responsible. Stealing and burning the harvest of successful members of minority 
groups are also reported (Esayas, 2009).23 
In this paper we focused on agricultural innovations but farmers may also be involved 
in non-agricultural innovations. In fact, in the long-term since dependence on agriculture is 
expected to decline with growth, non-agricultural innovations are expected to become more 
important. Some of the anecdotal evidence from qualitative data indicates that envy becomes 
even stronger in relation to activities that are very different from their main farming 
activities; extension agents indicate the negative attitude becomes stronger when innovations 
are very novel (Tiumelesan, 2009). If true, this has a significant implication both for our 
research results as well as future rural development. At a more general level, the development 
of non-agricultural sectors is crucial in the structural transformation of economies and the 
negative consequence of envy can become a formidable obstacle against rural development. 
One of our findings from analysing the underlying motives of money burning 
behaviour is that inequality aversion doesn’t seem to be a dominant motive. This conclusion 
seems to be supported by some of the qualitative data coming from the focus group 
discussions. In the focus group discussions, using a simple hypothetical example, people 
were asked whether they would prefer to live in a community with high level of inequality 
but higher average income or a low level of inequality but lower average income. Even 
                                                 
22 In the regression analyses reported in Section 4, we experimented with different social groups such as 
dominant and minority ethnic groups, people born in the village or outside.  Since we don’t have information on 
the clans/sub-clans of individuals we cannot explore whether the relevant social money burning rates are across 
clans/sub-clans. 
23 In supplementary regression analysis we explored if the relevant money burning behaviour is that of certain 
social groups rather than all other individuals in the village. For example, for an individual from a minority 
ethnic group in the village the relevant money burning rate may be that of the dominant ethnic group rather than 
all other people in the village. If social networks are organised around place of birth, the relevant envy can be 
whether the individual is born in the village or outside. To explore these, additional regressions with average 
money burning rates of the dominant and minority ethnic groups, of people born inside and outside the village 
and a combination of the two were run. In this set-up, the relevant money burning rates may be the average of 
the group in which the individual belongs or the average of the group to which the individual does not belong. 
We did not find statistically significant differences by sub-groups. The small size of our subsamples may be one 
reason why we fail to detect differences. Similar analysis on sub-clan membership of participants cannot be 
done since we do not have the information. Obviously, further research is needed. 
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though there were utterances that equality is good, most of the respondents preferred the 
unequal but richer community. Many accepted inequality almost as a natural order – “lengths 
of our fingers are not equal, hence inequality is inevitable”. Some argued that inequality is 
the basis for respect among people – “if there is equality there will be no respect among 
people”. These reinforce the result that inequality aversion probably is not a strong 
motivation for money burning behaviour. 
As indicated in the introductory section envy can be constructive if people positively 
respond by emulating those that are more successful than themselves; but it can also be a 
destructive force if people destroy others’ resource because of envious preferences. To 
capture the destructive aspect of envy we used money burning behaviour in an experimental 
game. The quantitative evidence supports that envy, even though on the individual level is 
correlated to higher innovation, has an externality (feedback) effect that is inimical to 
innovation. The qualitative evidence also seems to support the destructive effect of envy. To 
our knowledge this is the first paper that attempts to measure levels of envy in a real life 
setting using experimental games and examine its effect on innovations particularly in a 
developing country context. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper employed money burning games to analyze the impact of envy or similar 
social preferences on agricultural innovation in Ethiopia. We did so by combining 
experimental and household survey data. The money burning rates in this research are lower 
than found in previous experiments (Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001), but the field 
implementation and strong social demands implied by the task are likely to have reduced the 
observed money burning, thus the money burning rate we observe can be considered as a 
lower bound that would otherwise be experienced in parallel situations. The significance of 
these effects is confirmed by the relevance of our social desirability measure in our data, 
although its hypothetical questionnaire nature may reduce its significance. We also 
considered a number of other variables, for example finding that lower digit ratios are 
predictors of greater money burning. 
At the individual and community level, envy, as measured by money burning 
behaviour, is correlated to agricultural innovations.  While individual money burning rates 
from lottery winnings are positively related to the adoption of agricultural innovations, there 
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is a negative social feedback effect; higher individual envy has a negative effect on 
agricultural innovations when there is high community level social envy. 
There are three take home messages for policy makers from this research. First, envy 
and similar social preferences matter for adoption behaviour, even when controlling for a 
number of other variables. Second, while changing preferences may be difficult, there may be 
institutional changes that can be made to help channel such preferences in a productive rather 
than a destructive direction, as argued by Grolleau et al. (2009). Third, the impact of strong 
negative social preferences as envy may be minimised if innovations are adopted at early 
stage by significantly large number of people in the community. The usual model of small 
number of adopters followed by the majority later may not be effective; a ‘big push’ of 
innovation may be required to break a sort of low equilibrium trap created by negative social 
preferences. That being said, obviously further research is needed. 
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 Figure 1: Partial effect of individual and interaction between individual and social 
money burning rates from lottery earnings on innovation index 
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Innovation index, social and individual money burning rates
 
 
Note: Each line is drawn by fixing individual money burning rates at the given levels as 
indicated in the legend; coefficients of the OLS model (3) from Table 5 are used. 
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Table 1. Money Burning Rates 
 Rural Addis Ababa 
Money burning Random matching Fixed matching Random matching 
From un-invested earnings 7.88 12.03 4.71 
From lottery earnings 9.16 12.42 5.80 
Overall 8.27 11.89 5.47 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  Rural Addis Ababa 
  Random 
matching 
Fixed 
matching 
Random 
matching 
Investment rates  0.29 0.49 0.63 
Emotions (1-3, lower values 
higher emotion) 
Anxiety 2.73 2.27 2.05 
Contempt 2.87 2.22 2.07 
Envy 2.87 2.42 2.14 
Fear of envy 2.79 2.28 2.22 
Happiness 1.11 1.43 1.82 
Irritation 2.78 2.40 2.22 
Jealousy 2.81 2.13 2.25 
Joy 1.16 1.47 1.57 
Shame 2.66 2.75 2.60 
Surprise 1.19 1.60 1.65 
Big Five (scale 1-5, higher 
value mean more)  
Extraversion 3.10 3.48 3.55 
Agreeableness 3.67 3.61 3.50 
Conscientiousness 4.00 4.12 3.88 
Neuroticism 2.49 2.61 2.42 
Openness 3.55 3.49 3.44 
Understand (1-5, higher 
values means less) 
Self-perceived 
understanding 
2.06 1.81 1.97 
Social desirability scale 
(scale 0-10, higher values 
mean more) 
 6.40 4.57 4.62 
Digit ratios Right digit ratio 0.96 0.95 0.96 
Left digit ratio 0.96 0.96 0.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean values for rural sample 
Land size (ha) 1.16     Primary education  0.35 
Male 0.65 Secondary education  0.12 
Household size 6.66 Higher education  0.03 
Age 46.24 Orthodox 0.40 
Married 0.79 Muslim 0.16 
Born in this village 0.85 Protestant 0.31 
Father born in this village 0.75 Catholic 0.13 
Mother born in this village 0.60   
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Table 4. Innovation Index 
Innovation index Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency 
1 19 12.67 12.67 
2 21 14.00 26.67 
3 30 20.00 46.67 
4 29 19.33 66.00 
5 21 14.00 80.00 
6 22 14.67 94.67 
7 6 4.00 98.67 
8 2 1.33 100.00 
Total 150 100.00  
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Table 6: Adoption of fertiliser, rain harvesting and improved seeds: Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fertiliser Rain harvesting Improved seeds 
Investment rate 2.780*** -4.268*** 4.165*** 
 (0.980) (1.623) (1.109) 
MBR (un-invested earnings) 2.193 136.678** 64.844** 
 (34.794) (56.967) (31.166) 
MBR (lottery earnings) 48.801* 47.646 64.407*** 
 (26.118) (37.015) (24.740) 
SMBR x MBR  -75.948 -1,748.122** -858.491** 
(un-invested earnings) (464.870) (717.348) (407.704) 
SMBR x MBR  -518.812* -550.446 -711.982** 
(lottery earnings) (289.405) (444.235) (286.631) 
Individual and household characteristics 
Land size (log) -0.301** -0.038 -0.228** 
 (0.146) (0.339) (0.113) 
Male 1.381*** -0.419 1.333*** 
 (0.443) (0.732) (0.395) 
Household size (log) 0.915*** 0.694 -0.425 
 (0.304) (0.556) (0.312) 
Age (log) 1.531** -0.722 1.438*** 
 (0.679) (0.877) (0.500) 
Married 0.057 -0.294 0.677 
 (0.463) (0.579) (0.492) 
Born in the village -0.495 1.927* 0.330 
 (0.512) (1.045) (0.419) 
Education (no education omitted) 
Primary education 0.943* -0.054 0.276 
 (0.514) (0.595) (0.297) 
Secondary education 1.411** -1.405 0.810 
 (0.663) (0.880) (0.592) 
Higher education  -0.390 0.000 0.768 
 (1.025) (0.000) (0.789) 
Religion (Orthodox Christian omitted) 
Muslim 0.392 -1.547 0.045 
 (0.548) (0.973) (0.391) 
Protestant -0.574 -6.958*** -0.512 
 (0.648) (2.414) (0.625) 
Catholic -0.656 -4.836*** -3.679*** 
 (0.502) (1.816) (0.936) 
Personality & social desirability scale 
Extraversion 0.057 -0.496 0.381 
 (0.322) (0.534) (0.340) 
Agreeableness -0.039 -0.367 -0.192 
 (0.208) (0.290) (0.182) 
Conscientiousness 0.183 -1.237** -0.042 
 (0.167) (0.534) (0.136) 
Neuroticism 0.471** 0.669** 0.141 
 (0.201) (0.310) (0.168) 
Openness -0.224 0.321 -0.378 
 (0.218) (0.339) (0.236) 
SDS 0.016 0.066 0.217** 
 (0.102) (0.157) (0.089) 
Digit ratios 
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Table 6: Adoption of fertiliser, rain harvesting and improved seeds: Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fertiliser Rain harvesting Improved seeds 
Right-hand digit ratio -7.031 11.551 -10.039** 
 (5.131) (10.117) (5.051) 
Left-hand digit ratio 0.832 -0.891 9.664* 
 (7.049) (9.240) (5.119) 
Emotions and subjective well-being 
Contempt  0.868*  0.231 
 (0.518)  (0.500) 
Irritation  0.866 1.775*** 0.213 
 (0.552) (0.617) (0.424) 
Surprise  -1.097 0.789 -2.495*** 
 (0.782) (1.409) (0.724) 
Envy  -1.597*** -0.308 -0.970* 
 (0.581) (0.910) (0.539) 
Jealousy  -0.257 -1.450** 0.752* 
 (0.455) (0.720) (0.428) 
Fear of envy  0.968** -4.911*** 0.009 
 (0.418) (1.592) (0.340) 
Joy  6.702*** -2.460 9.772*** 
 (1.179) (2.179) (1.392) 
Anxiety  0.883* 1.824*** 0.576 
 (0.463) (0.679) (0.514) 
Happiness -5.079*** -3.207 -9.035*** 
 (1.341) (1.964) (1.425) 
Shame -0.015 -2.289* 0.016 
 (0.384) (1.274) (0.330) 
Subjective well-being  0.115 0.520** 0.148 
 (0.097) (0.211) (0.091) 
Village dummies  
T. Kechema -0.384 -1.401 2.018*** 
 (0.798) (0.973) (0.643) 
Imdibir -3.367*** -3.205** 0.207 
 (0.798) (1.311) (0.650) 
Aze Deboa -1.072 6.277*** 1.472** 
 (0.939) (2.173) (0.750) 
    
Constant -3.000 -2.456 -7.897* 
 (5.671) (9.991) (4.671) 
No. of observations 180 175 180 
 
Note: MBR: money burning rate; SMBR: social money burning rate; both MBR and SMBR are 
defined with respect to other un-invested earnings or lottery earnings (this is specified in brackets); 
Land size is specified in hectares; SDS = Social Desirability Scale; Yetmen provides baseline in 
relation to village dummies; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
